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Abstract Static analysis of binary code is challenging for several reasons. In
particular, standard static analysis techniques operate over control-flow graphs,
which are not available when dealing with self-modifying programs which can
modify their own code at runtime. We formalize in the Coq proof assistant
some key abstract interpretation techniques that automatically extract memory
safety properties from binary code. Our analyzer is formally proved correct
and has been run on several self-modifying challenges, provided by Cai et al.
in their PLDI 2007 article.
Keywords Coq ¨ abstract interpretation ¨ low-level programming language
Publication history: this article is a revised and extended version of the
paper “Verified Abstract Interpretation Techniques for Disassembling Low-level
Self-modifying Code” published in the ITP 2014 conference proceedings.
1 Introduction
Abstract interpretation [16] provides advanced static analysis techniques with
strong semantic foundations. It has been applied on a large variety of program-
ming languages. Still, specific care is required when adapting these techniques
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to low-level code, specially when the program to be analyzed comes in the
form of a sequence of bits and must first be disassembled. Disassembling is the
process of translating a program from a machine friendly binary format to a
textual representation of its instructions. It requires to decode the instructions
(i.e., understand which instruction is represented by each particular bit pattern)
but also to precisely locate the instructions in memory. Indeed instructions
may be interleaved with data or arbitrary padding. Moreover once encoded,
instructions may have various byte sizes and may not be well aligned in memory,
so that a single byte may belong to several instructions.
To thwart the problem of locating the instructions in a program, one must
follow its control-flow. However, this task is not easy because of the indirect
jumps, whose targets are unknown until runtime. A static analysis needs to
predict with enough precision, given an expression denoting a jump target, the
values it may evaluate to.
In addition, instructions may be produced at runtime, as a result of the
very execution of the program. A simple example is the modification of some
operands (e.g., registers) of existing instructions. Another example is the
creation of new sequences of instructions in existing code. Such programs
are called self-modifying programs; they are commonly used in security as an
obfuscation technique (e.g., to protect the intellectual property of the program
authors, to increase the stealth of malware) [33], as well as in just-in-time
compilation and in operating systems (mainly for improving performances).
Analyzing a binary code is mandatory when this code is the only available
part of a software. Because the instructions of a self-modifying program are not
the instructions that will be executed, most of standard reverse engineering
tools (e.g., the IDA Pro disassembler and debugger, a de facto standard for
the analysis of binary code) cannot disassemble and analyze self-modifying
programs. In order to disassemble and analyze such programs, one must very
precisely understand which instructions are written and where. And for all
programs, one must check every single memory write to decide whether it
modifies the program code.
As the real code of a self-modifying program is hidden and varies over time,
self-modifying programs are also beyond the scope of the vast majority of formal
semantics of programming languages. Indeed a prerequisite in such semantics is
the isolation and the non-modification of code in memory. Turning to verified
static analyses, they operate over toy languages [8, 27] or more recently over
realistic C-like languages [32, 6], but they assume that the control-flow graph
is extracted by a preliminary step, and thus they do not encompass techniques
devoted to self-modifying code.
In this paper, we formalize with the Coq proof assistant key static analysis
techniques to predict the possible targets of the computed jumps and make
precise which instructions alter the code and how, while ensuring that the other
instructions do not modify the program. Our static analysis techniques rely
on two main components classically used in abstract interpretation, abstract
domains and fixpoint iterators, that we detail in this paper.
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Our formalization effort is divided in three parts. Firstly, we formalize
a small binary language in which code is handled as regular mutable data.
Secondly, we formalize and prove correct an abstract interpreter that takes as
input an initial memory state, computes an over-approximation of the reachable
states that may be generated during the program execution, and then checks
that all reachable states maintain memory safety. Finally, we extract from our
formalization an executable OCaml tool that we run on several self-modifying
challenges, provided by Cai et al. [11].
The article makes the following contributions.
– We push further the limit in terms of verified static analysis by tackling
the specific challenge of binary self-modifying programs, such as fixpoint
iteration without control-flow graph and simple trace partitioning [22].
– We provide a complementary approach to [11] by automatically inferring the
required state invariants that enforce memory safety. Indeed, the axiomatic
semantics of [11] requires programs to be manually annotated with invariants
written in a specific program logic.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. First, Section 2 briefly
introduces the static analysis techniques we formalized. Then, Section 3 defines
the semantics of our low-level language. Section 4 details our abstract interpreter.
Section 5 describes some improvements that we made to the abstract interpreter,
as well as the experimental evaluation of our implementation. We finish this
article by a discussion of related work in section Section 6, followed by future
work and conclusions in section Section 7.
Availability The Coq development underlying this article can be consulted
on-line at http://www.irisa.fr/celtique/ext/smc.
Notations Option types are used to represent potential failures. For functions
returning “option” types, txu (read: “some x”) corresponds to success with
return value x, and H (read: “none”) corresponds to failure. In the context of
abstract interpretation, where abstract values represent sets of concrete values,
it is often convenient to distinguish two interpretations of such an option type:
the absence of a definite value may be interpreted as the empty set or as the full
set. Therefore, we introduce two different option types, botlift A and toplift A,
abbreviated respectively A+K and A+J:
Inductive botlift (A:Type) : Type := Bot | NotBot (x:A).
Inductive toplift (A:Type) : Type := All | Just (x:A).
Notation "A +K" := (botlift A). Notation "A +J" := (toplift A).
These types are equipped with a monad structure; hence we use standard
operators bind, lift and notation do a Ð m; b. We note K for Bot, J for Top,
and overload the notation txu for NotBot x and Just x.
2 Disassembling by Abstract Interpretation
We now present the main principles of our analysis on the program shown
in Figure 1. It is printed as a sequence of bytes (on the extreme left) as well
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Initial program Possible final program Initial assembly listing
07000607 07000607 0: cmp R6, R7
03000000 03000000 1: gotoLE 5
00000005 00000004 2:
00000000 00000000 3: halt R0
00000100 00000100 4: halt R1
09000000 09000000 5: cst 4 Ñ R0
00000004 00000004 6:
09000002 09000002 7: cst 2 Ñ R2
00000002 00000002 8:
05000002 05000002 9: store R0 Ñ *R2
04000000 04000000 10: goto 1
00000001 00000001 11:
Figure 1 A self-modifying program: as a byte sequence (left); after some execution steps
(middle); assembly source (right).
as under a disassembled form (on the extreme right) for readability purposes.
This program, as we will see, is self-modifying, so these bytes correspond to
the initial content of the memory from addresses 0 to 11. The remainder of the
memory (addresses in r´231;´1s Y r12; 231 ´ 1s), as well as the content of the
registers, is unknown and can be regarded as the program input.
All our example programs target a machine operating over a low-level
memory made of 232 cells, eight registers, and flags — boolean registers that
are set by comparison instructions. Each memory cell or register stores a 32 bits
integer value, that may be used as an address in the memory. Programs are
stored as regular data in the memory; their execution starts from address zero.
Nevertheless, throughout this paper we write the programs using the follow-
ing custom syntax. The instruction cst v Ñ r loads register r with the given
value v. The instruction cmp r, r’ denotes the comparison of the contents of
registers r and r’. The instruction gotoLE d is a conditional jump to d, it is taken
if in the previous comparison the content of r’ was less than or equal to the
one of r; goto d is an unconditional jump to d. The instructions load *r Ñ r’
and store r’ Ñ *r denote accesses to memory at the address given in register r;
and halt r halts the machine with as final value the content of register r.
The programming language we consider is inspired from x86 assembly;
notably instructions have variable size (one or two bytes, e.g., the length of the
instruction gotoLE 5 stored at line 1 is two bytes, the byte 03000000 for goto and
one byte for 5) and conditional jumps rely on flags. In this setting, a program
is no more than an initial memory state, and a program point is simply the
address of the next instruction to execute.
In order to understand the behavior of this program, one can follow its code
as it is executed starting from the entry point (byte 0). The first instruction
cmp R6, R7 compares the (statically unknown) content of two registers. This
comparison modifies only the states of the flags. Then, the gotoLE 5 instruction
is executed and, depending on the outcome of this comparison, the execution
proceeds either to the following instruction (stored at byte 3), or from byte 5.
Verified Abstract Interpretation Techniques for Disassembling Low-level SMC 5
Since the analysis cannot predict which branch will be taken, both branches
must be analyzed.
Executing the block from byte 5 will modify the byte 2 belonging to the
gotoLE instruction (highlighted in Figure 1); more precisely it will change the
jump destination from 5 to 4: the store R0 Ñ *R2 instruction writes the content
of register R0 (namely 4) in memory at the address given in register R2 (namely 2).
Notice that a program may directly read from or write to any memory cell: we
assume that there is no protection mechanism as provided by usual operating
systems. After the modification is performed, the execution jumps back to the
modified instruction, jumps to byte 4 then halts, with final value the content
of register R1.
This example highlights that the code of a program (or its control-flow
graph) is not necessarily a static property of this program: it may vary as the
program runs. To correctly analyze such a program, one must discover, during
the fixpoint iteration, the two possible states of the goto instruction at program
points 1 and 2 and its two possible targets (i.e., 4 and 5). More specially, we
need at least to know, for each program point (i.e., memory location), which
instructions may be decoded from there when the execution reaches this point.
This in turn requires to know what are the values that the program operates on.
We therefore devise a value analysis that computes, for each reachable program
point (i.e., in a flow sensitive way) an over-approximation of the content of
the memory and the registers, and the state of the flags, when the execution
reaches that point.
The analysis relies on a numeric abstract domain N7 that provides a rep-
resentation for sets of machine integers and abstract arithmetic operations.
γN P N7 Ñ Ppintq denotes the associated concretization function. Relying on
such a numeric domain, one can build abstract transformers. They model the
execution of each instruction over an abstract memory that maps locations (i.e.,
memory addresses1 and registers) to abstract numeric values. An abstract state
is then a mapping that attaches such an abstract memory to each program
point of the program, and thus belongs to addrÑ `paddr` regq Ñ N7˘.
To perform one abstract execution step, from a program point pp and
an abstract memory state m7 that is attached to pp, we first enumerate all
instructions that may be decoded from the set γNpm7pppqq. Then for each of
such instructions, we apply the matching abstract transformer. This yields a
new set of successor states whose program points are dynamically discovered
during the fixpoint iteration.
The abstract interpretation of a whole program iteratively builds an approx-
imation executing all reachable instructions until nothing new is learned. This
iterative process may not terminate, since there might be infinite increasing
chains in the abstract search space. As usual in abstract interpretation, we accel-
erate the iteration using widening operations [16]. Once a stable approximation
is finally reached, an approximation of the program listing or control-flow graph
can be produced.
1 Type addr is a synonym of int, the type of machine integers.
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0 A a a a a a a a a a
1 ¨ A a a a a C c c c
2 ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨
3 ¨ ¨ A A A A A C C c
4 ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ B b b
5 ¨ ¨ A a a a a a a a
6 ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨
7 ¨ ¨ ¨ A a a a a a a
8 ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨
9 ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ A a a a a a
10 ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ B b b b b

















Figure 2 Iterative fixpoint computation
To illustrate this process, Figure 2 shows how the analysis of the program
from Figure 1 proceeds. We do not expose a whole abstract memory but only
the underlying control-flow graph it represents. On this specific example, three
different graphs are encountered during the analysis. For each program point pp,
we represent a node with same name and link it with all the possible successor
nodes according to the decoding of the set γNpm7pppqq. The array shows the
construction of the fixpoint: each line represents a program point and the
columns represent the iterations of the analysis. In each array cell lies the
name of the control-flow graph representing the abstract memory for the given
program point during the given iteration; a dot stands for an unreachable
program point. The array cells whose content is in upper case highlight the
program points that need to be analyzed: they are the worklist.
Initially, at iteration 0, only program point 0 is known to be reachable
and the memory is known to exactly contain the program denoted by the
first control-flow graph (called a in Figure 2 and corresponding to the initial
program of Figure 1). The only successor of point 0 is point 1 and it is updated
at the next iteration. After a few iterations, point 9 is reached and the abstract
control-flow graph a is updated into the control-flow graph b that is propagated
to point 10. This control-flow graph corresponds to the possible final program
of Figure 1, where program-point 5 became unreachable. At the next iteration,
program point 1 (i.e., the loop condition) is reached again and the control-flow
graph b is updated into the control-flow graph c that correspond to the union
of the two previous control-flow graphs. After a few more iterations, the process
converges.
In addition to a control-flow graph or an assembly listing, more properties
can be deduced from the analysis result. We can prove safety properties about
the analyzed program, like the fact that its execution is never stuck.
The analysis produces an over-approximation of the set of reachable states.
In particular, a superset of the reachable program points is computed, and
for each of these program points, an over-approximation of the memory state
when the execution reaches this program point is available. Thus we can check
that for every program point that may be reached, the next execution step
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Definition addr := Int.int.
Inductive reg := R0 | R1 | R2 | R3 | R4 | R5 | R6 | R7.
Inductive flag := FLE | FLT | FEQ.
Inductive comparison := Ceq | Cne | Clt | Cle | Cgt | Cge.
Inductive binop := OpAdd | OpSub | OpMul | OpDivs | OpShl | OpShr | OpShru
| OpAnd | OpOr | OpXor | OpCmp (c: comparison) | OpCmpu (c: comparison).
Inductive instruction :=
(* arithmetic *)
| ICst (v:int) (dst:reg) | ICmp (src dst: reg)
| IBinop (op: binop) (src dst: reg)
(* memory *)
| ILoad (src dst: reg) | IStore (src dst: reg)
(* control *)
| IGoto (tgt: addr) | IGotoInd (r: reg) | IGotoCond (f: flag) (tgt: addr)
| ISkip | IHalt (r: reg).
Figure 3 Abstract syntax of our low-level language
from this point cannot be stuck. This verification procedure is formally verified,
as described in the following section.
3 Semantics of our Binary Language
This section defines the abstract syntax and semantics of the low-level language
our static analyzer operates over. The semantics uses a decoding function
from binary code to our low-level language. The semantics is presented as a
small-step operational semantics that can observe self-modifying programs.
3.1 Abstract Syntax
The programming language in which are written the programs to analyze is
formalized using the abstract syntax shown on Figure 3. In the Coq formaliza-
tion, the abstract syntax is presented as inductive data types. Machine integers
(type int) are those of the CompCert library Int of 32 bits machine integers [5].
The eight registers of our language are called R0, . . . R7 and there are three
register flags called FLE (for “less or equal” comparisons), FLT (for “less than”
comparisons) and FEQ (for “equality” comparisons).
Instructions are either arithmetic expressions, or memory accesses or control-
flow instructions. Instructions for accessing memory are ILoad and IStore; their
operands are registers. So as to keep the language simple, memory accesses are
limited to these two instructions: the other instructions, which are described
next, only operate on registers. Arithmetic expressions consist of integer con-
stants, signed comparisons and binary operations. Control-flow instructions
consist of unconditional and conditional jump instructions, the empty instruc-
tion ISkip and the IHalt instruction which halts the program execution. For
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unconditional jumps, we distinguish register-indirect jumps (IGotoInd r instruc-
tions, where r is a register) from other jumps (i.e., absolute jumps, written as
IGoto v, where v is a literal constant address).
In a binary language, there is no distinction between code and data: a value
stored in memory can be interpreted either as representing data or as encoding
instructions. So as to model a binary language, we first introduce a decoding
function called dec. Its type is (addr→int) → pp → option(instructionˆnat). Given
a memory mem of type addr → int (i.e., a function from addresses to values) and
an address pp of type addr, this function yields the instruction stored at this
address along with its byte size (so as to know where the next instruction
begins). This size is of type nat, the Coq type for natural numbers. Since not
all integer sequences are valid encodings, this decoding may fail (hence the
option type). In order to be able to conveniently write programs, there is also
a matching encoding function called enc, whose type is instruction → list int.
However the development does not depend on it at all: properties are stated in
terms of already encoded programs.
The decoding function is defined in Figure 4. The binary decoding of a
sequence of bytes stored in memory m at program point pp is written (dec m pp). A
successful decoding yields a pair (i,sz), where sz is the size of i, the instruction
stored at address pp in m2.
The binary format of instructions is arbitrary and has little impact on the
design of the analyzer. We rely on the fact that the encoding length can be
inferred from the first byte of any encoded instruction3. The self-modifying
programs that we consider rely on the particular encoding that we chose. This
encoding works as follows. Instructions that hold a value (e.g., IGoto 5) require
two bytes: the value occupies the second byte; other instructions require one
byte. The first byte is made of four fields of one octet each: the decoding of
this first byte first extracts the content of each field using Euclidean divisions
(performed by the split_instruction function). The first field (typ) corresponds
to the constructor of the instruction data type. From its value, one can deduce
the size of the instruction and how to interpret the next fields. The second
field (flg) holds a flag (only used in the IGotoCond instruction). The third and
fourth fields hold respectively the source and destination registers. Depending
on the instruction, none, both or only one of them may be relevant. Unused
fields always have the value zero. This encoding is very sparse: many byte
sequences do not represent any valid instruction. Moreover, in the decoding
function, errors are propagated by the bind operator of the error monad, written
do a ← m; b.
2 The size cannot be deduced from the instruction as: 1. the encoding function is not
known; and 2. they may be several encodings, of various sizes, for a single instruction.
3 This is not the case, for instance, of the encoding of x86 instructions, that may begin
with an arbitrary number of one-byte prefixes
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Definition decode_register (v: Z) : option register :=
match v with 0 ñ tR0u | 1 ñ tR1u | ... | 7 ñ tR7u | _ ñH end.
Definition decode_flag (v: Z) : option flag :=
match v with 0 ñ tFLEu | 1 ñ tFLTu | 2 ñ tFEQu | _ ñH end.
Definition decode_binop (v: Z) : option binop :=
match v with 0 ñ tOpAddu | 1 ñ tOpSubu | ... | 9 ñ tOpXoru | _ ñH end.
Definition split_instruction (v: int) : Z ˆ Z ˆ Z ˆ Z :=
let v := Int.unsigned v in
let (v, dst) := Z.div_eucl v 256 in
let (v, src) := Z.div_eucl v 256 in
let (v, arg) := Z.div_eucl v 256 in
let (v, typ) := Z.div_eucl v 256 in (typ, arg, src, dst).
Definition dec (m: addrÑ int) (base: addr) : option (instruction ˆ nat) :=
match split_instruction (m base) with
| (0, 0, src, 0) ñ do rsÐ decode_register src; t(IHalt rs, 1)u
| (1, 0, 0, 0) ñ t(ISkip, 1)u
| (2, 0, src, 0) ñ do rsÐ decode_register src; t(IGotoInd rs, 1)u
| (3, flg, 0, 0) ñ do fÐ decode_flag flg; t(IGotoCond f (m (base+1)), 2)u
| (4, 0, 0, 0) ñ t(IGoto (m (base+1)), 2)u
| (5, 0, src, dst) ñ do rsÐ decode_register src;
do rdÐ decode_register dst; t(IStore rs rd, 1)u
| (6, 0, src, dst) ñ do rsÐ decode_register src;
do rdÐ decode_register dst; t(ILoad rs rd, 1)u
| (7, 0, src, dst) ñ do rsÐ decode_register src;
do rdÐ decode_register dst; t(ICmp rs rd, 1)u
| (8, o, src, dst) ñ do opÐ decode_binop o;
do rsÐ decode_register src;
do rdÐ decode_register dst; t(IBinop op rs rd, 1)u
| (9, 0, 0, dst) ñ do rdÐ decode_register dst; t(ICst (m (base+1)) rd, 2)u
| _ ñH end.
Figure 4 Decoding binary code
3.2 Semantics
The language semantics is given as a small-step transition relation between
machine states. A machine state may be xpp, f, r, my where pp is the current
program point (address of the next instruction to be executed), f is the current
flag state, r is the current register state, and m is the current memory. Such
a tuple is called a machine configuration (type machine_config). Otherwise, a
machine state is rvs, meaning that the program stopped returning the value v.
Values are machine integers (type int).
The semantics is defined in Figure 5 as a set of rules of the following shape:
dec m pp = tpi, szqu
xpp, f, r, myù xpp’, f’, r’, m’y.
The premise states that decoding the bytes in memory m from address pp
yields the instruction i whose size in memory is sz. Then each rule describes
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Definition compare (i j: int) (f: flag) : bool :=
match f with
| FLE ñ negb (Int.lt j i) | FLT ñ Int.lt i j | FEQ ñ Int.eq i j end.
dec m pp = tpICst v rd, szqu
xpp, f, r, myù xpp+sz, f, r # rd Ð v, my
dec m pp = tpICmp rs rd, szqu
xpp, f, r, myù xpp+sz, compare r(rd) r(rs), r, my
dec m pp = tpIBinop op rs rd, szqu
xpp, f, r, myù xpp+sz, f, r # rd Ð (r(rs) [op] r(rd)), my
dec m pp = tpILoad rs rd, szqu
xpp, f, r, myù xpp+sz, f, r # rd Ð m(r(rs)), my
dec m pp = tpIStore rs rd, szqu
xpp, f, r, myù xpp+sz, f, r, m # r(rd) Ð r(rs)y
dec m pp = tpIGoto v, szqu
xpp, f, r, myù xv, f, r, my
dec m pp = tpISkip, szqu
xpp, f, r, myù xpp+sz, f, r, my
dec m pp = tpIGotoCond c v, szqu
xpp, f, r, myù xif f(c) then v else pp+sz, f, r, my
dec m pp = tpIGotoInd rd, szqu
xpp, f, r, myù xr(rd), f, r, my
dec m pp = tpIHalt rs, szqu
xpp, f, r, myùrr(rs)s
Figure 5 Concrete semantics
how to execute a particular instruction at program point pp in memory m
with flag state f and register state r. In each case, most of the state is kept
unchanged. Instructions that are not branching proceed their execution at
program point pp+sz (since sz is the size of this instruction once encoded). In
the rules, the notation s # id Ð v stands for the update of state s with a new
value v of register or memory cell id.
Instruction ICst v rd updates destination register rd with value v. Instruction
ICmp rs rd updates the flag state according to the comparison (compare) of the
values held by the two involved registers. Instruction IBinop op rs rd applies
the denotation [op] of the given binary operator op to the contents r(rs) and
r(rd) of registers rs and rd. Then, it updates the state of register rd: in r, the
new value of rd thus becomes r(rs) [op] r(rd). Instruction ILoad rs rd updates
register rd with the value m(r(rs)) found in memory at the address given in
register rs. Instruction IStore rs rd updates the memory at the address given
in register rd with the value given in register rs.
Instruction IGoto v sets the program point to v. Instruction ISkip does noth-
ing: execution proceeds at next program point. Conditional jump instruction
IGotoCond c v jumps to address v or falls through to pp+sz depending on the
current state of flag c. Indirect jump instruction IGotoInd rd proceeds at the pro-
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gram point found in register rd. Instruction IHalt rs terminates the execution,
returning the content of register rs.
Finally, we define the semantics vPw of a program P as the set of states s that
are reachable from an initial state x0, f, r, Py, with current program point
zero and memory P (where ù‹ denotes the reflexive-transitive closure of the
small-step relation):
vPw “ ts | Df r, x0, f, r, Pyù‹ su .
Notice that the program P belongs to the state: it is initially known, but
can be modified as the execution goes on.
4 Abstract Interpreter
The static analyzer is specified, programmed and proved correct using the Coq
proof assistant. This involves several steps that are described in this section:
designing abstract domains and abstract semantics, as well as writing a fixpoint
iterator, and lastly stating and proving soundness properties about the results
of the static analysis.
In order to analyze programs, we build an abstract interpreter, i.e., an
executable semantics that operates over abstract elements, each of them rep-
resenting many concrete machine configurations. Such an abstract domain
provides operators that model basic concrete operations: read a value from a
register, store some value at some address in memory, and so on. The static
analyzer then computes a fixpoint within the abstract domain, that over-
approximates all reachable states of the analyzed program. We first describe
our abstract domain before we head to the abstract semantics and fixpoint
computation.
4.1 Abstract Domains
Our abstract interpreter operates over an abstract memory domain. This
abstract domain handles a (simplified) lattice structure, plus some abstract
transformers that we describe below. It is parameterized by a numeric abstract
domain that abstracts numerical values. The same notion of lattice structure
is used in both signatures. We now describe these different signatures.
Weak Lattice. Each abstract domain handles a set of lattice operators that
are convenient for programming abstract transformers and performing fixpoint
computation. Figure 6 presents the type class weak_lattice. It is parameterized
by a carrier type A and handles an order test leb, a top element, a join operator
and a widening operator. The class only contains the operator signatures and
not their specifications.
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Class weak_lattice (A: Type) : Type := {
leb: A Ñ A Ñ bool;
top: A;
join: A Ñ A Ñ A;
widen: A Ñ A Ñ A
}.
Class gamma_op (A B: Type) : Type := γ : A Ñ P (B).
Record adom (A B:Type) (WL: weak_lattice A) (Gamma: gamma_op A B) : Prop := {
gamma_monotone: @ a1 a2, leb a1 a2 = true Ñ γ a1 Ď γ a2;
gamma_top: @ x, x P γ top;
join_sound: @ x y, γ x Y γ y Ď γ (join x y)
}.
Figure 6 Signature of weak lattices and concretizations
In the same figure, we provide the record signature adom that contains
soundness specifications for leb, top and join. We rely on an abstract interpre-
tation methodology that only manipulates concretization functions, instead
of full Galois connections (see [9] for a discussion about this design choice).
The concretization operator γ transforms an abstract element into its counter-
part concrete property (i.e., a set of concrete elements). A concrete property
P P PpAq is conservatively (over-)approximated by an abstract element p7 if
P Ď γpp7q.
A concretization operator is given a dedicated type class signature. This
design choice allows us to overload the γ notation and let the type class inference
mechanism automatically infer which instance of gamma_op must be considered
each time we write γ. The same facility is used for type weak_lattice. As a
consequence, the weak lattice WL and the gamma operator Gamma are implicitly
considered in the fields of record adom.
Note at last, that we do not require any property for the widening operator.
It is used during fixpoint computation to speedup convergence but we do
not prove termination of this iterative process and validate a posteriori the
correctness of the obtained limit.
Numeric Abstract Domain. The heart of our abstract interpreter performs
numeric abstraction in order to infer numeric properties on the memory content.
Figure 7 gives the signature of numeric abstract domains ab_machine_int. In
addition to the previous weak_lattice, gamma_op and adom components, the record
handles three operators concretize, const_int and forward_int_binop, together
with their specifications.
The operator concretize transforms an abstract numeric value into a finite
set of machine integers it represents. This set is always finite but can be
very large. The type fint_set contains a special constructor that implicitly
represents all integers. We can rely on it when we do not want to enumerate the
elements of a too large set. Note that this type is equipped with its own gamma_op
instantiation and we implicitly use it in the specification concretize_correct.
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Record ab_machine_int (int7:Type) : Type :=
{ as_int_wl :> weak_lattice int7
; as_int_gamma :> gamma_op int7 int
; as_int_adom :> adom int7 int as_int_wl as_int_gamma
; concretize: int7 Ñ fint_set
; concretize_correct: @ (x:int7), γ x Ď γ (concretize x)
; const_int: intÑ int7
; const_int_correct: @ n: int, n P γ (const_int n)
; forward_int_binop: int_binary_operationÑ int7 Ñ int7 Ñ int7+K
; forward_int_binop_sound: @ op (x y:int7),
Eval_int_binop op (γ x) (γ y) Ď γ (forward_int_binop op x y)
}.
Figure 7 Signature of abstract numeric domains
This operator is necessary when we need to concretize a set of memory cells
that may be targeted by a memory load or store.
The other operators are standard forward abstract transformers. The oper-
ator const_int returns the best abstraction for a constant and forward_int_binop
approximates the denotation [op] (see Section 3) of a binary operator; the
Eval_int_binop function that appears in its specification lifts this denotation to
sets of machine integers.
We provide two numeric domains that instantiate this interface: intervals
with congruence information [1] and finite sets. This part of the development is
described in [6] and we have made our formal development sufficiently modular
to benefit from future improvements in the Verasco project [20].
Memory Abstract Domain. An abstract memory domain is a carrier type
along with some primitive operators whose signatures are given in Figure 8.
The carrier type ab_mc is equipped with a lattice structure. An object of
this type represents a set of triples flag-state ˆ register-state ˆ memory, as
described by the primitive gamma. Such a triple ultimately represents any machine
configuration with matching components at any program point (see gamma_to_mc).
A memory domain can be queried for the values stored in some register
(var) or at some known memory address (load_single); these operators return
an abstract numeric value. Other operators enable us to alter an abstract state,
like assign that sets the contents of a register to a given abstract numeric value,
and store_single that similarly updates the memory at a given address.
The operator compare updates the abstract counterpart of the flag state
when two given registers are compared. We can also use the operator assume
when we know the boolean value of a flag. This operator is a reduction. It is
always sound to return the same abstract state as the first argument, but a
more precise information may allow to gain precious information when reaching
a conditional branch. The operator init is used when initializing the abstract
14 Sandrine Blazy et al.
Definition pre_machine_config := flag_state ˆ register_state ˆ memory.
Instance gamma_to_mc {A} (G:gamma_op A pre_machine_config)
: gamma_op A machine_config :=
λ a mc, (mc_flg mc, mc_reg mc, mc_mem mc) P γ(a).
Record mem_dom (int7 ab_mc: Type) :=
{ as_wl: weak_lattice ab_mc
; as_gamma : gamma_op ab_mem pre_machine_config
; as_adom : adom ab_mc machine_config as_wl as_gamma
; var: ab_mcÑ regÑ int7
; var_sound: @ ab:ab_mem, @ m: machine_config,
m P γ(ab)Ñ@ r, mc_reg m r P γ(var ab r)
; load_single: ab_mcÑ addrÑ int7
; load_sound: @ ab:ab_mem, @ m: machine_config,
m P γ(ab)Ñ@ a:addr, m(a) P γ(load_single ab a)
; store_single: ab_mcÑ addrÑ int7 Ñ ab_mc
; store_sound: @ ab:ab_mem, @ dst v,
Store (γ ab) dst v Ď γ (store_single ab dst v)
; compare: ab_memÑ registerÑ registerÑ ab_mem
; compare_sound: @ ab:ab_mem, @ rs rd,
Compare (γ ab) rs rd Ď γ(compare ab rs rd)
; assign: ab_mcÑ regÑ int7 Ñ ab_mc
; assign_sound: @ ab:ab_mem, @ rd v,
Assign (γ ab) rd v Ď γ(assign ab rd v)
; assume: ab_memÑ flagÑ boolÑ ab_mem+K
; assume_sound: @ ab:ab_mem, @ f b,
Assume (γ ab) f b Ď γ(assume ab f b)
; init: memoryÑ list addrÑ ab_mem
; init_sound: @ (m: memory) (dom: list addr) f r (m’: memory),
(@ a, List.In a domÑ m a = m’ a)Ñ
(f, r, m’) P γ(init m dom)
}.
Figure 8 Signature of abstract memory domains
interpreter with an abstraction of the initial memory. Part of the initial memory
is exactly known: the initial program text, static data and so on. Therefore the
init operator gets a list dom of addresses and a function m that gives the values
of the actual initial memory m’ at these addresses.
All these operators obey some specifications. As an example, the load_sound
property states that given a concrete state m in the concretization of an abstract
state ab, the concrete value stored at any address a in m is over-approximated
by the abstract value returned by the matching abstract load. The γ symbol
is overloaded through the use of type classes: its first occurrence refers to the
concretization from the abstract memory domain (the gamma field of record
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Definition load_many (m: ab_mc) (a: int7) : int7+K :=
match concretize a with
| Just addr_set ñ IntSet.fold
(λ acc addr, acc \ NotBot (T.(load_single) m addr)) addr_set Bot
| All ñ NotBot top
end.
Figure 9 Example of abstract transformer
mem_dom) and its second occurrence is the concretization from the numeric
domain ab_num.
Such an abstract memory domain is implemented using two maps. The first
one, ab_reg, maps each register to an abstract numeric value and represents the
register state. Thes second one, ab_mem, maps concrete addresses to abstract
numeric values and represents the memory.
Record ab_machine_config :=
{ ab_reg: Map [ reg, int7 ] ; ab_mem: Map [ addr, int7 ] }.
To prevent the domain of the ab_mem map from infinitely growing, we bound
it by a finite set computed before the analysis: the analysis will try to compute
some information only for the memory addresses found in this set. The content
of this set does not alter its soundness: the values stored at addresses that are
not in it are unknown and the analyzer makes no assumptions about them. On
the other hand, the success of the analysis and its precision depend on it. In
particular, the analyzed set must cover the whole code segment. To compute
this set, one possible method [1] is to start from an initial guess and, every
time the analysis discovers that the set is too small (when it infers that control
may reach a point that is not is the set), the analysis is restarted using a larger
set. In practice, for all our examples, running the analysis once was enough,
taking as initial guess the addresses of the instructions of the initial program.
4.2 Abstract Semantics
As a second layer, we build abstract transformers over any such abstract
domain. Consider for instance the abstract load called load_many and presented
in Figure 9; it is used to analyze any ILoad instruction (T denotes a record of type
mem_dom int7 ab_mc). The source address may not be exactly known, but only
represented by an abstract numeric value a. Since any address in γ(a) may be
read, we have to query all of them and take the least upper bound of all values
that may be stored at any of these addresses:
Ů tT.(load_single) m x | x P γpaqu.
However the set of concrete addresses may be huge and care must be taken: if
the size of this set exceeds some threshold, the analysis gives up on this load
and yields top, representing all possible values.
We build enough such abstract transformers to be able to analyze any
instruction (function ab_post_single, shown in Figure 10). This function returns
a list of possible next states, each of which being either Hlt v (the program halts
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Inductive ab_post_res := Hlt(v:int7) | Run(pp:addr)(m:ab_mc) | GiveUp.
Definition bot_cons {A B} (f: AÑ B) (a: A+K) (l: list B) : list B :=
match a with NotBot a’ ñ f a’ :: l | Bot ñ l end.
Definition ab_post_single (m:ab_mc) (pp:addr) (instr:instruction ˆ nat)
: list ab_post_res :=
match instr with
| (IHalt rs, sz) ñ Hlt (T.(var) m rs) :: nil
| (ISkip, sz) ñ Run (pp + sz) m :: nil
| (IGoto v, sz) ñ Run v m :: nil
| (IGotoInd rs, sz) ñ
match concretize (T.(var) m rs) with
| Just tgt ñ IntSet.fold (λ acc addr, Run addr m :: acc) tgt nil
| All ñ GiveUp :: nil
end
| (IGotoCond f v, sz) ñ
bot_cons (Run (pp + sz)) (T.(assume) m f false)
(bot_cons (Run v) (T.(assume) m f true) nil)
| (IStore rs rd, sz) ñ
Run (pp + sz) (store_many m (T.(var) m rd) (T.(var) m rs)) :: nil
| (ILoad rs rd, sz) ñ
match load_many m (T.(var) m rs) with
| NotBot v ñ Run (pp + sz) (T.(assign) m rd v) :: nil
| Bot ñ nil
end
| (ICmp rs rd, sz) ñ Run (pp + sz) (T.(compare) m rs rd ) :: nil
| (ICst v rd, sz) ñ Run (pp + sz) (T.(assign) m rd v) :: nil
| (IBinop op rs rd, sz) ñ
match T.(forward_int_binop) op (T.(var) m rs) (T.(var) m rd) with
| NotBot v ñ Run (pp + sz) (T.(assign) m rd v) :: nil
| Bot ñ nil
end
end.
Definition ab_post_many (pp: addr) (m:ab_mc) : list ab_post_res :=
match abstract_decode_at pp m with
| Just instr ñ flat_map (ab_post_single m pp) instr
| All ñ GiveUp :: nil
end.
Figure 10 Abstract small-step semantics
returning a value approximated by v) or Run pp m (the execution proceeds at
program point pp in a configuration approximated by m) or GiveUp (the analysis
is too imprecise to compute anything meaningful).
The computed jump (IGotoInd) also has a dedicated abstract transformer
(inlined in Figure 10): in order to know from where to continue the analysis,
we have to enumerate all possible targets. The abstract transformer for the
conditional jump IGotoCond f v returns a two-element list. The first element
means that the execution may proceed at pp + sz (i.e., falls through) in a state
where the branching flag f is known to evaluate to false; the second element
represents the case when the branch is taken: the flag is known to evaluate to
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Record analysis_state :=
{ worklist: list addr
; result_fs: Map [ addr, ab_mc ] (* one value per pp; unbound values are K *)
; result_hlt: d+K (* final value *)
}.
Definition analysis_init I : analysis_state :=
{| worklist := Int.zero :: nil
; result_fs := ([])[ Int.zeroÐ I ]
; result_hlt := Bot
|}.
Figure 11 Internal state of the analyzer
true, and the next program point, v, is the one given in the instruction. Since
each assume may return K meaning that the considered branch cannot be taken,
we use the combinator bot_cons that propagates this information: the returned
list does not contain the unreachable states.
Then, function ab_post_many performs one execution step in the abstract. To
do so, we first need to identify what is the next instruction, i.e., to decode
in the abstract memory from the current program point. This may require to
enumerate all concrete values that may be stored at this address. Therefore
this abstract decoding either returns a set of possible next instructions or gives
up. In such a case, the whole analysis will abort since the analyzed program is
unknown.
4.3 Fixpoint Computation
Finally, a full program analysis is performed applying this abstract semantics
iteratively. The analysis follows a worklist algorithm as the one found in [1,
§ 3.4]. It maintains a state holding three pieces of data (see Figure 11):
1. the worklist, a list of program points left to explore; initially a singleton;
2. the current solution, mapping to each program point an abstract machine
configuration; initially empty, but at program point zero, where it holds an
abstraction of the program;
3. an abstraction of the final value, initially K.
A single step of analysis is performed by the function analysis_step shown in
Figure 12. It picks a node n in the worklist — unless it is empty, meaning that
the analysis is over — and retrieves the abstract configuration ab_mc associated
with this program point in the current state. The abstract semantics is then
applied to this configuration; it yields a list next of outcomes (see Figure 10)
that are then propagated to the analysis state (function propagate). If the
outcome is GiveUp, then the whole analysis aborts. Otherwise, if it is Run n’ ab
— meaning that ab describes reachable configurations at program point n’ —,
this abstract configuration is joined with the one previously associated with
that program point. In case something new is learned, the program point n’ is
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Definition analysis_step (E:analysis_state) : analysis_state+J :=
match E.(worklist) with
| nil ñ Just E (* fixpoint reached *)
| n :: l ñ
match find_bot E.(result_fs) n with
| NotBot ab_mc ñ
let next := ab_post_many n ab_mc in
List.fold_left
(λ acc res, do E’Ð acc; propagate (widen_oracle n res) E’ res)
next
(Just {| worklist := l
; result_fs := E.(result_fs)
; result_hlt:= E.(result_hlt) |})
| Bot ñ All (* cannot happen *)
end
end.
Definition propagate (widenp: bool) (E: analysis_state) (n: ab_post_res)
: analysis_state+J :=
match n with
| GiveUp ñ All
| Run n’ ab ñ
let old := find_bot E.(result_fs) n’ in
let new := (if widenp then widen else join) old (NotBot ab) in
if new Ď old
then Just E
else Just {| worklist := push n’ E.(worklist)
; result_fs := bot_set E.(result_fs) n’ new
; result_hlt := E.(result_hlt) |}
| Hlt res ñ (* similar case *)
end.
Figure 12 Body of the main analysis loop
pushed on the worklist. If it is Hlt res, then the abstraction of the final value
is updated similarly.
Since there may be infinite ascending chains, so as to ensure termination,
we need to apply widening operators instead of regular joins frequently enough
during the search. Therefore the analysis is parameterized by a widening
strategy that decides along which edges of the control-flow graph widening
should be applied instead of a plain join. The implementation allows to easily
try different strategies. The one we implemented mandates a widening on every
edge from a program point to a smaller one, i.e., when jumping to a program
point that is before in the address space.
The analysis repeatedly applies the analysis step until the worklist is empty
(see Figure 13). So as to ensure that the analysis indeed terminates, we rely on
a counter (known as fuel) that obviously decreases at each iteration; when it
reaches zero, the analyzer must give up.
To enhance the precision, we have introduced three more techniques: a
dedicated domain to abstract the flag state, a partitioning of the state space,
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Fixpoint analysis_loop (fuel: nat) (E: analysis_state) : analysis_state+J :=
match fuel with
| O ñ Just E
| S fuel’ ñ
do E’Ð analysis_step E;
if is_final E’ then Just E’ else analysis_loop fuel’ E’ end.
Definition analysis (P: memory) (dom: list int) fuel : analysis_state+J :=
analysis_loop fuel (analysis_init (T.(init) P dom)).
Figure 13 Main analysis
and a use of abstract instructions. They will be described in the next section
(§ 5); we first describe how we conducted the soundness proof of this analyzer.
4.4 Soundness of the Abstract Interpreter
We now describe the formal verification of our analyzer. The soundness property
we ensure is that the result of the analysis of a program P over-approximates
its semantics vPw. This involves on one hand a proof that the analysis result is
indeed a fixpoint of the abstract semantics and on the other hand a proof that
the abstract semantics is correct with respect to the concrete one.
The soundness of the abstract semantics is expressed by the following lemma,
which reads: given an abstract state ab and a concrete one m in the concretization
of ab, for each concrete small-step m ù m’, there exists a result ab’ in the list
ab_post_single m.(pc) ab that over-approximates m’. Our use of Coq type classes
enables us to extensively overload the γ notation and write this statement in a
concise way as follows.
Lemma ab_post_many_correct : @ (m:machine_config) (m’:machine_state) (ab:ab_mc),
m P γ(ab)Ñ m ù m’Ñ m’ P γ(ab_post_single m.(pc) ab).
The proof of this lemma follows from the soundness of the various abstract
domains (as load_sound in Figure 8), transformers and decoder.
Lemma abstract_decode_at_sound : @ (m:machine_config)(ab:ab_mc)(pp:addr),
m P γ(ab)Ñ dec m.(mc_mem) pp P γ(abstract_decode_at pp ab).
The proof that the analyzer produces a fixpoint is not done directly. Instead,
we rely on a posteriori verification: we do not trust the fixpoint computation and
instead program and prove a checker called validate_fixpoint. Its specification,
proved thanks to the previous lemma, reads as follows.
Lemma validate_correct : @ (P: memory) (dom: list addr) (E: AbEnv),
validate_fixpoint P dom E = trueÑ vPw Ď γ(E).
Going through this additional programming effort has various benefits. On
the one hand, a direct proof of the fixpoint iterator would be very hard: in
particular, it would require difficult proofs over the widening operators of all
abstract domains [29]. On the other hand, we can adapt the iteration strategy,
optimize the algorithm and so on with no additional proof effort.
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This validation checks two properties of the result E: that the result over-
approximates the initial state; and that the result is a post-fixpoint of the
abstract semantics, i.e., for each abstract state in the result, performing one
abstract step leads to abstract states that are already included in the result.
These properties, combined to the soundness of the abstract semantics, ensure
the conclusion of this lemma.
Finally we pack together the iterator and the checker with another operation
performed on sound results that checks for its safety. The resulting analysis
enjoys the following property: if, given a program P, it outputs some result,
then that program is safe.
Theorem analysis_sound : @ (P: memory) (dom: list addr) (fuel: nat)
(int7: num_dom_index), analysis int7 P dom fuel ‰HÑ safe P.
The arguments of the analysis program are the program to analyze, the list
of addresses in memory to track, the counter that enforces termination and
the name of the numeric domain to use. We provide two numeric domains:
intervals with congruence information and finite sets.
5 Case Studies and Analysis Extensions
The extraction mechanism of Coq enables us to generate an OCaml program
from our development and to link it with a front-end. Hence we can automati-
cally analyze programs and prove them safe. This section shows the behavior of
our analyzer on chosen examples, most of them taken from [11] (they have been
rewritten to fit our custom syntax). All examples are written in an assembly-like
syntax with some syntactic sugar: labels refer to byte offsets in the encoded
program, the enc(i) notation denotes the encoding of the instruction i. The
study of some examples highlights the limits of the basic technique presented
before and drives some refinement of the analyzer as we describe below. These
extensions have been integrated to our formalization and proved correct. The
running time of the analysis of these examples is too short to be interesting to
measure. The source code of all the examples that are mentioned thereafter is
available on the companion web site [14].
5.1 Basic Example
The multilevel run-time code generation program of Figure 14 is a program
that, when executed, writes some code to the addresses starting at line gen and
runs it; this generated program, in turn, writes some more code at line ggen
and runs it. Finally execution starts again from the beginning. Moreover, at
each iteration, register R6 is incremented.
The analysis of such a program follows its concrete execution and exactly
computes the content of each register at each program point. It thus correctly
tracks what values are written and where, so as to be able to analyze the
program as it is generated.
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cst 0 Ñ R6
cst 1 Ñ R5
loop: add R5 Ñ R6
cst gen Ñ R0
cst enc(store R1 Ñ *R2) Ñ R1
store R1 Ñ *R0
cst enc(goto R2) Ñ R1
cst gen + 1 Ñ R0
store R1 Ñ *R0
cst ggen Ñ R2
cst loop Ñ R0





Figure 14 Multilevel run-time code generation
cst -128 Ñ R6
add R6 Ñ R1
cmp R6, R1
gotoLT ko
cst -96 Ñ R7
cmp R1, R7
gotoLE ko
store R0 Ñ *R1
ko:halt R0
Figure 15 Array bounds check
However, when the execution reaches program point loop again, both states
that may lead to that program point are merged. And the analysis of the
loop body starts again. After the first iteration, the program text is exactly
known, but each iteration yields more information about the dynamic content
of register R6. Therefore we apply widening steps to ensure the termination of
the analysis: the widening operator (of the memory domain) is used instead of
the join operator on every edge from a program point to a smaller program
point (i.e., in this example, from program point ggen to program point loop).
Finally, the set of reachable program points is exactly computed and for each
of them, we know what instruction will be executed from there.
Many self-modifying programs are successfully analyzed in a similar way:
opcode modification, code obfuscation, and code checking [14].
5.2 A First Extension: Dealing with Flags
The example program in Figure 15 illustrates how conditional branching relies
on implicit flags. This program stores the content of R0 in an array (stored in
memory from address ´128 to address ´96) at the offset given in register R1.
Before that store, checks are performed to ensure that the provided offset lies
inside the bounds of the array. The destination address is compared against
the lowest and highest addresses of the array; if any of the comparisons fails,
then the store is bypassed.
To properly analyze this program, we need to understand that the store
does not alter the code. When analyzing a conditional branch instruction, the
abstract state is refined differently at its two targets, to take into account
that a particular branch has been taken and not the other. However, the only
information we have is about one flag, whereas the comparison that set this
flag operated on the content of registers. We therefore need to keep the link
between the flags and the registers.
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To this end, we extend our ab_machine_config record4 with a field containing
an optional pair of registers ab_reg: (reg ˆ reg)+J. It enables the analyzer to
remember which registers were involved in the last comparison (the J value is
used when this information is unknown). With such information available, even
though the conditional jump is not directly linked to the comparison operation,
we can gain some precision in the various branches. More precisely, the compare
operator can now be implemented as follows.
compare x rs rd := lift (λ x’, {| ab_flg := t(rs, rd)u
; ab_reg := x’.(ab_reg)
; ab_mem := x’.(ab_mem) |}) x
Back to the example of Figure 15, when we assume that the first conditional
branch is not taken, the flag state is abstracted by the pair t(R6,R1)u, so we
refine our knowledge about register R1: its content is not less than the content of
register R6, namely ´128. Similarly, when we assume that the second conditional
branch is not taken, the abstract flag state is t(R1,R7)u, so we can finally infer
that the content of register R1 is in the bounds.
The actual implementation of such a precise assume relies on a backward
transfer function of the numeric domain. The signature presented Figure 7 is
extended with the two following fields: an abstract backward binary operation
and its soundness criterion.
; backward_int_binop:
int_binary_operationÑ int7 Ñ int7 Ñ int7 Ñ int7+K * int7+K
; backward_int_binop_sound: @ op (x y z: int7) (i j: int),
i P γ(x)Ñ j P γ(y)Ñ (eval_int_binop op i j) P γ(z)Ñ
let (x’,y’) := backward_int_binop op x y z in
i P γ(x’) ^ j P γ(y’)
This transfer function takes as argument a binary operator op and three
abstract values x, y and z, where z is meant to represent the result of the
binary operation applied to x and y (or more precisely, to any values i and
j in their concretizations). It then returns a pair (x’,y’) expected to be a
more precise abstraction of the actual arguments. As an example, consider
an interval domain. The call backward_int_binop OpAdd [0;4] [0;2] [5;6] could
return the intervals ([3;4],[1;2]): knowing that the result of the addition is in
the range [5;6] enables us to infer more precise ranges for the inputs.
Given such a backward transfer function, assume can be implemented as
shown in Figure 16: if the registers Ru and Rv involved in the last comparison
are known, then the abstract values u and v associated to them can be refined
using the backward operator for the given comparison. In case any of these
refined values is K, this information is propagated to the whole abstract state:
the branch is unreachable and should not be analyzed any further.
Special care has to be taken in the assign transfer function. If a register
that is part of the abstract flag is updated, then no information about its new
content can be inferred from the outcome of the comparison. Therefore, in such
cases, the abstract flag is simply forgotten, i.e., set to J.
4 This record has been introduced in Section 4.1.
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Definition assume (x: ab_machine_config) (f: flag) (b: bool)
: ab_machine_config+J+K :=
match x.(ab_flg) with
| t(Ru, Rv)u ñ
let u := find_def x.(ab_reg) Ru in
let v := find_def x.(ab_reg) Rv in
let op := match f with FLE ñ Cle | FLT ñ Clt | FEQ ñ Ceq end in
let v’u’ := backward_int_binop (OpCmp op) v u (const_int (of_bool b)) in
match v’u’ with
| (NotBot v’, NotBot u’) ñ
NotBot t{| ab_reg := (x.(ab_reg)) [ RuÐ u’ ] [ RvÐ v’ ]
; ab_flg := x.(ab_flg); ab_mem := x.(ab_mem) |}u
| _ ñ Bot end
| _ ñ NotBot x end
Figure 16 Implementation of the assume transfer function
This extension of the abstract domain has little impact on the formalization,
but greatly increases the precision of the analyzer on programs with conditional
branches. Indeed, without this extension, the analyzer cannot deduce anything
from the guards of conditional branches as it ignores all comparison instructions.
5.3 A Second Extension: Trace Partitioning
During the execution of a self-modifying program, a given part of the memory
may contain completely unrelated code fragments. When these fragments are
analyzed, since they are stored at the same addresses, flow sensitivity is not
enough to distinguish them. If these fragments are merged in the abstract state,
then the two programs get mixed and it is no longer possible to predict the
code that is executed with sufficient precision. To prevent such a precision loss,
we use a specific form of trace partitioning [22] that makes an analysis sensitive
to the value of a particular memory location.
Consider as an example the polymorphic program of Figure 17. Polymor-
phism here refers to a technique used by for instance viruses that change their
code while preserving their behavior, so as to hide their presence. The main loop
of this program (bytes 4 to 39) repeatedly adds forty-two to register R3 (two add
instructions at bytes 13 and 14). However, it is obfuscated in two ways. First,
the source code initially contains a jump to some random address (byte 13).
But this instruction will be overwritten (bytes 7 to 12) before it is executed.
Second, this bad instruction is written back (bytes 4 to 6 and 15 to 17), but at
a different address (byte 14 is overwritten). The remainder of the loop swaps
the contents of memory at addresses 11 and 16, and at addresses 12 and 17
(execution from byte 18 to byte 27, and from byte 28 to byte 37, respectively).
So when the execution reaches the beginning of the loop, the program stored
in memory is one of two different versions, both featuring the unsafe jump. In
other words, this program features two variants that are functionally equivalent
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0: cst 40 Ñ R7
2: cst 21 Ñ R0
4: cst 13 Ñ R4
6: load *R4 Ñ R1
7: cst 14 Ñ R4
9: load *R4 Ñ R2
10: cst 13 Ñ R4
12: store R2 Ñ *R4
13: goto R7
14: add R0 Ñ R3
15: cst 14 Ñ R4
17: store R1 Ñ *R4
18: cst 11 Ñ R4
20: load *R4 Ñ R2
21: cst 16 Ñ R4
23: load *R4 Ñ R1
24: store R2 Ñ *R4
25: cst 11 Ñ R4
27: store R1 Ñ *R4
28: cst 12 Ñ R4
30: load *R4 Ñ R2
31: cst 17 Ñ R4
33: load *R4 Ñ R1
34: store R2 Ñ *R4
35: cst 12 Ñ R4
37: store R1 Ñ *R4
38: goto 4
40:
Figure 17 Polymorphic program
and look equally unsafe. And running any version changes the program into
the other version.
When analyzing this program, the abstract state computed at the beginning
of the loop must over-approximate the two program versions. Unfortunately it
is not possible to analyze the mere superposition of both versions, in which the
unsafe jump may occur. The two versions can be distinguished through, for
instance, the value at address 12. We therefore prevent the merging of any two
states that disagree on the value stored at this address. Two different abstract
states are then computed at each program point in the loop, as if the loop
were unrolled once.
More generally, the analysis is parameterized by a partitioning criterion
δ: ab_mc Ñ K that maps abstract states to keys (of some type K). No abstract
states whose keys differ according to this criterion are merged. Taking a constant
criterion amounts to disabling this partitioning. The abstract interpreter now
computes for each program point a map from keys to abstract states (rather
than only one abstract state).
Definition vpAbEnv : Type := (Map [ addr, Map [ K, ab_mc ] ] * int7+K).
Such an environment E represents the following set of machine configurations
(ignoring the halted configurations represented by the second component):
γpEq “ tc P machine_config | Dk, c P γ ppfst Eqrc.(pc)srksqu
This means that the actual key under which an abstract state is stored has no
influence on the concrete states it represents. It can only improve the precision:
if two abstract states x and y are mapped to different keys hence not merged,
they can represent the concrete set γpxq Y γpyq which may be smaller than
γpx\ yq.
For instance, the criterion used to analyze the polymorphic program of
Figure 17 maps an abstract state m to the value stored at address 12 in all
concrete states represented by m; or to an arbitrary constant if there may be
many values at this address.
To implement this technique, we do not need to modify the abstract domain,
but only the iterator and fixpoint checker. The worklist holds pairs (program
point, criterion value) rather than simple program points. The iterator and
fixpoint checker (along with its proof) are straightforwardly adapted. The
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cst -1 Ñ R7
load *R7 Ñ R0
cst key+1 Ñ R6
cst 1 Ñ R1
cst 1 Ñ R2
loop: cmp R1, R0
gotoLE last
cst 1 Ñ R7
add R7 Ñ R1
cst 0 Ñ R3
add R2 Ñ R3
key: cst 0 Ñ R4
add R4 Ñ R2




safety checker does not need to be updated since we can forget the partitioning
before applying the original safety check.
Thanks to this technique, we can selectively enhance the precision of the
analysis and correctly handle challenging self-modifying programs: control-flow
modification, mutual modification, and code encryption [14]. However, the
analyst must manually pick a suitable criterion for each program to analyze;
the analyzer itself is not able to figure out what criterion to use. In practice,
we have used the contents of some particular register or memory location.
When using this extension, the termination of the analysis may not be
guaranteed any longer as the type K may have infinitely many values (or too
many for the analysis to enumerate them all). To ensure termination, Kinder
[22] proposes a widening operator that merges keys at a particular program
point when the number of different keys encountered at this program point
exceeds some threshold. We did not implement such a widening operator and
require the analyst to be careful when the partitioning criterion is designed.
5.4 A Third Extension: Abstract Decoding
The program in Figure 18 computes the nth Fibonacci number in register R2,
where n is an input value read from address ´1 and held in register R0. There
is a for-loop in which register R1 goes from 1 to n and some constant value is
added to register R2. The trick is that the actual constant (which is encoded as
part of an instruction and is stored at the address held in R6) is overwritten at
each iteration by the previous value of R2.
When analyzing this program, we cannot infer much information about the
content of the patched cell. Therefore, we cannot enumerate all instructions
that may be stored at the patched point. So we introduce abstract instructions:
instructions that are not exactly known, but of which some part is abstracted
by a suitable abstract domain. Here we only need to abstract values using
a numeric domain: the resulting instruction set is shown in Figure 19. This
abstraction of the instructions could be pushed further to capture other self-
modification patterns. For instance a program might modify only the encoding
of a register; in such a case, the “register” part of the instructions could be
abstracted by a finite set of registers.
With such a tool, we can decode in the abstract: the analyzer does not
recover the exact instructions of the program, but only the information that
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Inductive ab_instruction (int7: Type) : Type :=
| AICst (v:int7) (dst:register) | AICmp (src dst: register)
| AIBinop (op: int_binary_operation) (src dst: register)
| AILoad (src dst: register) | AIStore (src dst: register)
| AIGoto (tgt: int7) | AIGotoInd (r: register)
| AIGotoCond (f: flag) (tgt: int7) | AISkip | AIHalt (r: register).
Figure 19 Abstract instructions
cst 0 Ñ R5
cst j+1 Ñ R0
cmp R5, R6
gotoLE h




(* ... slice of ab_post_single ... *)
| (AIGotoCond f tgt, sz) ñ
bot_cons (Run (pp + sz)) (T.(assume) m f false)
match T.(assume) m f true with
| NotBot m’ ñ
match concretize tgt with
| Just tgt ñ IntSet.fold
(λ acc addr, Run addr m’ :: acc) tgt nil
| All ñ GiveUp :: nil
end
| Bot ñ nil
end
Figure 21 Abstract conditional jump
some (unknown) value is loaded into register R4, which is harmless (no stores
and no jumps depend on it).
This self-modifying code pattern, in which only part of an instruction is
overwritten occurs also in the vector dot product example [14] where specialized
multiplication instructions are emitted depending on an input vector.
For this technique to be effective, the numeric abstract domain has to
support it: mapping abstract values to abstract instructions (i.e., abstract
decoding) should be more efficient than just enumerating all concrete values.
The abstract semantics (Figure 10) has to be slightly modified to deal with
this new instruction set. In particular, all jumps behave like indirect jumps:
their targets are only known as abstract values. For the analysis to follow such
a jump, all concrete destinations need to be enumerated. However, consider the
example shown Figure 20: it compares an input value (held in register R6) to
zero, and depending on the outcome, either terminates, modifies itself and then
terminates. The conditional jump on line j is unsafe: its target is overwritten
on the line before with some input value (the contents of register R7). But
the whole program is actually safe, because the branching condition is always
false5. Therefore, the abstract transformer for conditional jumps (Figure 21)
tries to prove that the branch cannot be taken before it enumerates its possible
targets; and the program of Figure 20 can be proved safe by our analyzer.
5 Such spurious branching instructions are known as “opaque predicates” and used mainly
for obfuscation [13].
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Program Result Comment
Opcode modification X
Multi-level run-time code gen. X
Bootloader × needs a model of system calls and interrupts
Control-flow modification X partitioning on the jump target (address 15)
Vector dot product X partitioning on loop counter (register R0); andabstract decoding
Run-time code checking X
Fibonacci X abstract decoding
Self-replication × code segment is “infinite”
Mutual modification X partitioning on the instruction to write (heldin register R0)
Polymorphic code X partitioning according to the different versionsof the program (e.g., address 12)
Code obfuscation X
Code encryption X partition on the loop counter (register R0)
Figure 22 Summary of self-modifying examples
5.5 Summary of the Case Studies
The techniques presented here enable us to automatically prove the safety of
various self-modifying programs including almost all the examples of Cai et
al. [11] as summarized in Figure 22. Out of twelve, only two cannot be dealt
with. The comment column of the table lists the extensions that are needed
to handle each example (if any), or the limitation of our analyzer. The boot
loader example does not fit in the considered machine model, as it calls BIOS
interrupts and reads files. The self-replicating example is a program that fills
the memory with copies of itself: the code, being infinite, cannot be represented
with our abstract domain. Our Coq development [14] features all the extensions
along with their correctness proofs, and several example programs including
the implementation of the programs listed in Figure 22.
6 Related Work
Most of the previous works on mechanized verification of static analyzes focused
on standard data-flow frameworks [23, 15, 4, 10] or abstract interpretation for
small imperative structured languages [3, 8, 27]. Klein and Nipkow instantiate
such a framework for inference of Java bytecode types [23]; Coupet-Grimal and
Delobel [15] and Bertot et al. [4] for compiler optimizations, and Cachera et
al. [10] for data-flow analysis.
The first attempt to mechanize abstract interpretation in its full generality is
Monniaux’s master’s thesis [24]. Using the Coq proof assistant and following the
orthodox approach based on Galois connections, he runs into difficulties with α
abstraction functions being nonconstructive, and with the calculation of abstract
operators being poorly supported by Coq. Later, Pichardie’s Ph.D. thesis [30,
28] mechanizes the γ-only presentation of abstract interpretation that we use.
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Blazy et al. use Pichardie’s approach to verify an interval analysis for the
RTL intermediate language of the CompCert formally verified compiler [6].
Our current work shares the same notion of abstract numerical domain but
develops its own notion of memory abstraction, dynamic control-flow graph
reconstruction and trace partitioning. Bertot [3] and Nipkow [27] give alternate
presentations of Pichardie’s approach, respectively in Coq and in Isabelle/HOL,
resulting in pedagogical abstract interpreters for the IMP mini-language.
Jourdan et al. extend the work described in [6] to a much more complex
source language, most of the ISO C 1999 language (excluding recursion and
dynamic allocation) [20] and use a more sophisticated static analysis tech-
nique (combination of several abstract domains, including relational domains).
Our current work formalizes complementary advanced abstract interpretation
techniques, but targeting self-modifying low-level code, and is based on sev-
eral recent non-verified static analyses. A large amount of work was done
by Balakrishnan et al. in this area [1]. Control-flow graph reconstruction was
specially studied by Kinder et al. [22] and Bardin et al. [2]. Still, these works are
unsound with respect to self-modifying code: they assume that the code cannot
be modified by memory writes and do not check that this assumption holds
for the analysed programs. Therefore, the analysis of self-modifying programs
can yield incorrect results.
The first formal semantics for self-modifying programs are defined in [18],
and then in [17] and [7]. These are paper-and-pencil semantics that operate over
small low-level languages as ours; they are used in a very different way from our
semantics. Gerth [18] defines an axiomatics semantics where semantic states
are modeled as arrays indexed by an instruction pointer. In [17], a denotational
semantics based on traces is used to identify the different phases of successive
program modifications during a program execution. An operational semantics
is defined in [7], where a rewriting process from self-modifying programs to
non-modifying programs is defined.
Our current work tackles a core subset of a self-modifying low-level program-
ming language. More realistic formalizations of x86 semantics were proposed [26,
25, 21] but none of them handles the problem of disassembling self-modifying
programs. Our work complements other verification efforts of low-level pro-
grams [12, 11, 19] based on program logics. While we provide automatic
inference of loop invariants, they are able to handle more expressive correctness
properties.
7 Conclusion and Perspectives
This work provides the first verified static analysis for self-modifying programs.
In order to tackle this challenge, we formalized original techniques such as
control-flow graph reconstruction and partitioning. We formalized these tech-
niques on a small core language but we managed to verify ten out of twelve of
the challenges proposed in [11].
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An important further work is to scale these technique to more realistic Coq
language models [25, 21]. Developing directly an analyzer on these representa-
tions may be a huge development task because of the number of instructions to
handle. One strategy could be to relate on a good intermediate representation
such as the one proposed by Rocksalt [25]. Our current work does not consider
the specific challenge of call stack reconstruction [1] that may require some
form of verified alias analysis [31]. This is an important place for further work.
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